jammu and kashmir history 3

Refrance....R.Guptas general knowledge

RAIDS AND ACCESSIONS
Sher-I-Kashmir on Raider & Accession, NOVEMBER 19, 1947
Accession to the Indian Union would be advantageous to the State both for political
and economic reasons. Boonomically Kashmir depends for its market much more
on India than Pakistan. Politically India was a much more progressive State than
Pakistan and Kashmir would have greater scope for free development according to
its own genius if she was allied to India.

OCTOBER 27, 1948
The raiders abducted women. They massacred children. They looted everything
and everyone. They converted mosques into brothels and today every Kashmiri
loathes the invading tribesmen and their arch inspirers, who have been responsible
for such horrors in land, which is peopled with an overwhelming majority of
Musalmans

SECURITY COUNCIL, FEBRUARY 6, 1948
We would prove before the Security Council that Kashmir and the people of Kashmir
have lawfully and constitutionally acceded to the Dominion of India and Pakistan
has no right to question that accession.

FEBRUARY 5, 1948
We have decided to work with and die for India. We made our decision not in
October last, but in 1944, when we resisted the advances of Mr Jinnah. Our refusal
was categorical.

PRESS CONFERENCE IN NEW DELHI, STATESMAN, MARCH 7, 1948
Pakistan has no right to demand plebiscite in Kashmir after committing aggression
on her. By her action Pakistan has permanently branded herself as the aggressor
and we can have no truck with her. We have made our choice and linked our
destiny with India and nothing can separate us now.

PUBLIC MEETING, SRINAGAR (HINDUSTAN TIMES) MAY 26, 1948
all Indians and India is our Homeland.
Kashmir will ever be with India, whatever sacrifices we shall have to make. We are

PRESS INTERVIEW, NATIONAL HERALD, JUNE 19, 1948
We have burnt all our boats. There is no place in Kashmir for a theocratic State.
Kashmir will never make a plaything of India's honour.

PRESS CONFERENCE IN NEW DELHI, SEPTEMBER 29, 1948
India and Pakistan represented two different and opposite ideologies. It was upto us to choose between the two. I and my colleagues in the Working Committee
were convinced that Kashmir's political, economical, material and cultural
advancement depended upon close political link up with India and India alone. At
special convention of the Representatives of J&K,

HINDU, OCT 14, 1948
The pledge I gave to Mr Nehru last year that Kashmir will be a part of India, has
now become an eternal bond. We can never forget the help rendered by Indian
Army and the people of India at a time of great crisis in the history of our State.
Indian troops have even provided the local people rations to save them from
starvation. It was after fully knowing India's attitude for over a year that the decision
for permanent accession was taken- a decision which would affect the entire
population of the State for generations to come. Our decision to accede to India is
based on the fact that our programme and policy are akin to those followed by
India.

NEWS CHRONICLE, MAY 26, 1949
The Pakistani Mujahid's treatment of unarmed people of Kashmir is an indelible
blot on the fair name of Islam. It is condemnable for the atrocities were perpetrated
and carried out in the name of Islam and for its glory.

SPEECH AT GM COLLEGE, SRINAGAR, TRIBUNE, DECEMBER 4, 1949
Pakistan's clamour for a free and impartial plebiscite, while her troops continue to
occupy almost half the territory of the State, was characteristically Hitlerite tactics.

MADRAS MEETING, FEBRUARY 12, 1950
In view of what I have said before, it is absurd to say that Kashmir still thinks any
other alternative so far as the question of accession is concerned. What we want is
peace and prosperity for our people. Independence may be and is a charming idea.
But as I have said before, is it practical too? Has it got necessary sanctions and
guarantees and can a small country like Kashmir with its limited resources maintain
it? Or are the countries concerned in a proper political temper at the present moment,
to give their willing assent to it. By only a formal declaration of independence
shall we not be making Kashmir a victim of some unscrupulous and powerful
country? That will be a gruesome betrayal of the cause we have stood for all these
years and therefore, these and similar other considerations, make the alternative of
Independence- not only theoretical and academic but also meaningless. In that
sense and spirit I have number of times before discussed the question with several
journalists. It is in this context that these views should be read and understood.

PRESS STATEMENT, MAY 1950
If the Muslims of Kashmir could resist aggression from Pakistan, when they had
no friends, why should anybody in India expect a change in the minds of Kashmiri

people when India has helped them against this aggression for these two years
with men, money and moral support and when hundreds of comrades from all
parts of India have given their all-out help to us and given their lives on the soil of
Kashmir and cemented the bonds between Kashmir and India. Nobody should
think that human beings are so ungrateful. We shall always be with India and never
with Pakistan.

WARDHA PRESS CONFERENCE, MAY 4, 1964

THE DELHI AGREEMENT, 1952
After the Constituent Assembly of the State had taken important decisions referred
to immediately above, it was deemed necessary to receive the concurrence of the
Indian Government. Accordingly, the representatives of Kashmir Government
conferred with the representatives of Indian Government and arrived at an
agreement. This arrangement was later on known as the "Delhi Agreement, 1952".
The main features of this agreement were:

(i) in view of the uniform and consistent stand taken up by the Jammu and
Kashmir Constituent Assembly that sovereignty in all matters other than those
specified in the Instrument of Accession continues to reside in the State, the
Government of India agreed that, while the residuary powers of legislature
vested in the Centre in respect of all states other than Jammu and Kashmir, in
the case of the latter they vested in the State itself:

(ii) it was agreed between the two Governments that in accordance with Article
5 of the Indian Constitution, persons who have their domicile in Jammu and
Kashmir shall be regarded as citizens of India, but the State legislature was
given power to make laws for conferring special rights and privileges on the
state subjects' in view of the State Subject Notifications of 1927 and 1932:
the State legislature was also empowered to make laws for the State Subjects
who had gone to Pakistan on account of the communal disturbances of 1947,
in the event of their return to Kashmir.

(iii) as the President of India commands the same respect in the State as he does
in other Units of India, Articles 52 to 62 of the Constitution relating to him
should be applicable to the State. It was further agreed that the power to
grant reprieves, pardons and remission of sentences etc; would also vest in
the President of India';

(iv) the Union Government agreed that the State should have its own flag in
addition to the Union flag, but it was agreed by the State Government that
the State flag would not be a rival of the Union flag; it was also recognised
that the Union flag should have the same status and position in Jammu and
Kashmir as in the rest of India, but for historical reasons connected with the
freedom struggle in the State, the need for continuance of the State flag was
recognised;

(v) there was complete agreement with regard to the position of the Sadar-i-
Riyasat; though the Sadar-i-Riyasat was to be elected by the State Legislature,
he had to be recognised by the President of 

India before his installation as
such; in other Indian States the Head of the 

State was appointed by the
President and was as such his nominee but 

the person to be appointed as the
Head, had to be a person acceptable to the Government of that State; no
person who is not acceptable to the State Government can be thrust on the
State as the Head. The difference in the case 

of Kashmir lies only in the fact
that Sadar-i-Riyasat will in the first place be elected by the State legislature
itself instead of being a nomince of the Government and the President of
India. With regard to the powers and functions of the Sadar-i-Riyasat the
following argument was mutually agreed upon (a) the Head of the State shall
be a person recognised by the President of the Union on the recommendations
of the Legislature of the State; (b) he shall hold office during the pleasure of
the President; (c) he may, by writing under his hand addressed to the President,
resign his office; (d) subject to the foregoing provisions, the Head of the
State shall hold office for a term of five years from the date he enters upon
his office; (e) provided that he shall, notwithstanding the expiration of his
term, continue to hold the office until his successor enters upon his office"
(vi) with regard to the fundamental rights, 

some basic principles agreed between
the parties were enunciated; it was accepted 

that the people of the State were
to have fundamental rights. But in the view of the peculiar position in which
the State was placed, the whole chapter 

relating to 'Fundamental Rights' of
the Indian Constitution could not be made applicable to the State, the question
which remained to be determined was 

whether the chapter on fundamental
rights should form a part of the State Constitution of the Constitution of
India as applicable to the State;

(vii) with regard to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of India, it was accepted
that for the time being, owing to the existence 

of the Board of Judicial Advisers
in the State, which was the highest judicial authority in the State, the Supreme
Court should have only appellate jurisdiction;
reat deal of discussion with regard to the "Emergency Powers";

(viii) there was a
the Government of India insisted on the application of Article 352,
empowering the President to proclaim a general emergency in the State; the
State Government argued that in the exercise of its powers over defence (Item
1 on the Union List), in the event of war or external aggression, the
Government of India would have full authority to take steps and proclaim
emergency but the State delegation was, however, averse to the President
exercising the power to proclaim a general emergency on account of internal
disturbance.In order to meet the viewpoint of 

the State's delegation, the Government of India

agreed to the modification of Article 352 in its application to Kashmir,
Both the parties agreed that the application of Article 356, dealing with suspension
of the State Constitution and 360, dealing with financial emergency, was not
necessary.
The Jammu and Kashmir Constituent 

Assembly discussed this arrangement and
finally adopted a motion of approach on 

August 21, 1952.
The agreement was discussed and accepted in the Union Parliament on August 7,
1952.
But in spite of all these discussions and 

decisions in the Kashmir Constituent
Assembly, the implementation of the 

agreement was not forthcoming. This aroused
suspicion in the minds of the public about the intentions of the leaders of the
Government. In the working committee of the National Conference there was sharp
criticism of the Government's policy. There 

was a serious rift in the Cabinet itself.
The difference of opinion reached a peak 

when Sheikh Abdullah, instead of
implementing the agreement, started 

advocating secession, which would make
Kashmir an 'independent State'. In fact, three members of the Cabinet submitted a
memorandum to Sheikh Abdullah accusing him of various charges. It soon became
obvious that the capacity of the Administration to function efficiently was doubtful.
The whole matter was spotlighted when the Sadar-i-Riyasat, who, taking cognisance
of the situation, on August 8, 1953, dismissed Sheikh Abdullah from the post of
Prime Minister of Kashmir and dissolved the Cabinet.

WROTE SADAR-I-RIYASAT, TO SHEIKH ABDULLAH
"This conflict within the Cabinet has for a considerable time been causing great
confusion and apprehension in the minds 

of the people of the State..... I have been
forced to the conclusion that the present 

Cabinet cannot continue in office any
longer and hence I regret to inform you that I have dissolved the Council of Ministers
headed by you." A lot of confusion arose on account of Sheikh Abdullah's dismissal, since there
had not been any 'No Confidence' motion 

in the Kashmir Assembly. It is true that
a Chief Minister is not generally dismissed, 

if he enjoys the confidence of the
House, but it has also to be accepted that the head of the State is obliged to ensure
the continuance of a stable government and 

if he has reasonable grounds to believe
that the Chief Minister has lost the confidence 

of the people, or if he is engaged
intreasonable activities he must replace him. 

At the time when Sheikh Abdullah
was dismissed and arrested, the Assembly was not in session, so a 'No Confidence
motion could not have been discussed. But 

it was important that the new ministry
should have a vote of confidence from the Assembly in the first session. Accordingly.

the Sadar-i-Riyasat wrote to Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad when inviting him to
form the new Cabinet, "the continuance in 

office of the new Cabinet will depend
upon its securing a vote of confidence from the Legislative Assembly during its
coming session." The State legislature met on October 5,1953, and passed a
unanimous vote of confidence in the new Cabinet.
The work of the Constituent Assembly started afresh with renewed vigour. 'Advisory
Committee on Fundamental Rights and Citizenship' and "Basic Principles
Committee" were set up on 20th October, 

1953.
The Assembly met on February 6th, 1954, 

and adopted the reports of the "Basic
Principles Committee on Fundamental Rights," thereby fulfilling one of the major
tasks with which it had been charged.
The 'Drafting Committee' presented its report 

on February 12th, 1954, and the
report was adopted on February 15th, 1954. 

The adoption of this report embodied
the ratification of the State's Accession to India.

TASHKENT DECLARATION

January 10, 1966

The Prime Minister of India and the President 

of Pakistan, having met at Tashkent

and having discussed the existing relations between India and Pakistan hereby
declare their firm resolve to restore normal 

and peaceful relations between their
countries and to promote understanding and friendly relations between their peoples.
They consider the attainment of these 

objectives of vital importance for the welfare
of the 600 million people of India and Pakistan:

(i) The Prime Minister of India and the 

President of Pakistan agree that both
sides will exert all efforts to create good neighbourly relations between India
and Pakistan in accordance with the United Nations Charter. They reaffirm
their obligation under the Charter not to have recourse to force and to settle
their disputes through peaceful means. They considered that the interests of
peace in their region and particularly in the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent and,
indeed, the interests of the people of India 

and Pakistan were not served by
the continuance of tension between the two countries. It was against this
background that Jammu and Kashmir was discussed, and each of the sides set
forth its respective position.

(ii) The Prime Minister of India and the 

President of Pakistan have agreed that all
armed personnel of the two countries shall be withdrawn not later than 25
February, 1966 to the positions they held prior 

to 5 August, 1965, and both
sides shall observe the cease-fire terms on the cease-fire line.

(iii) The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that
relations between India and Pakistan shall 

be based on the principle of non-
interference in the internal affairs of each 

other.

(iv) The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that
both sides will discourage any propaganda directed against the other country
and will encourage propaganda which 

promotes the development of friendly
relations between the two countries.

(v) The Prime Minister of India and the 

President of Pakistan have agreed that
High Commissioner of India to Pakistan and 

the High Commissioner of
Pakistan to India will return to their posts and that the normal functioning of
diplomatic missions of both countries will be restored. Both Governments
shall observe the Vienna Convention of 1961 

on Diplomatic Intercourse.

(vi) The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed to
consider measures towards the restoration 

of economic and trade relations,
communications as well as cultural 

exchanges between India and Pakistan,
and to take measures to implement the 

existing agreements between India
and Pakistan.

(vii) The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that
they will give instructions to their respective authorities to carry out the
repatriation of the prisoners of war.

(viii) The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that
the two sides will continue the discussions 

of questions relating to the problems
of refugees and evictions/illegal 

immigrations. They also agreed that both
sides will create conditions which will 

prevent the exodus of people. They
further agree to discuss the return of the property and assets taken over by
either side in connection with the conflict.

(ix) The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that
the two sides will continue meetings both at highest and at other levels matters
of direct concern to both countries. Both 

sides have recognised the need to set
up joint Indian-Pakistani bodies which will report to their Governments in
order to decide what further steps should be taken. The Prime Minister of
India and the President of Pakistan record 

their feelings, deep appreciation
and gratitude to the leaders of the Soviet 

Union, the Soviet Government and
personally to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR for their.
constructive, friendly and noble part in 

bringing about the present meeting
which has resulted in mutually satisfactory results. They also express to the
Government and friendly people of Uzbekistan their sincere thankfulness for
their overwhelming reception and generous hospitality. They invite the
Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the 

USSR to witness this declaration

SHIMLA AGREEMENT
July 3, 1972
The Government of India and the Government 

of Pakistan are resolved that the
two countries put an end to the conflict and confrontation that have hitherto marred

their relations and work for the promotion 

of a friendly and harmonious relationship
and the establishment of durable peace in the sub-continent, so that both countries
may henceforth devote their resources and energies to the pressing task of advancing
the welfare of their people.
In order to achieve this objective, the Government of India and the Government of
Pakistan have agreed as follows:

(i) That the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations shall
govern the relations between the two 

countries.

(ii) That the two countries are resolved to 

settle their deferences by peaceful
means through bilateral negotiations or by 

any other peaceful means mutually
agreed upon between them.

(iii) That the pre-requisite for reconciliation, good neighbourliness and durable
peace between them is a commitment by both the countries to peaceful co-
existence, respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty and
non-interference in each other's internal affairs, on the basis of equality and
mutual benefit.

(iv) That the basic issues and causes of conflict which have bedevilled the relations
between the two countries for the last 25 years shall be resolved by peaceful
means.

(v) That they shall always respect each other's national unity, territorial integrity,
political independence and sovereign equality;

(vi) That in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, they will refrain
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of each other.
In order to progressively to restore and normalise relations between the two countries
step by step, it was agreed that:

(i) Steps shall be taken to resume communications, postal, telegraphic, sea, land
including border, posts and air links including over-flights.

(ii) Appropriate steps shall be taken promote travel facilities for the nationals of
the other country.

(iii) Trade and co-operation in economic and other agreed fields will be resumed
as far as possible.

(iv) Exchange in the fields of science and 

culture will be promoted.

In order to initiate the process of the establishment of durable peace, both the
Governments agree that:

(i) Indian and Pakistani forces shall be withdrawn to their side of the international
border.

(ii) In Jammu and Kashmir, the line of control resulting from the cease-fire of
December 17, 1971, shall be respected by both sides without prejudice to the
recognised position of either side. Neither side shall seek to alter it unilaterally,

irrespective of mutual differences and legal interpretations. Both sides furthe
undertake to refrain from the threat or the use 

of force in violation of this line

(ii) The withdrawals shall commence upon 

entry into force of this agreement and
shall be completed within a period of 30 days thereof.
This agreement will be subject to ratification 

by both countries in accordance with
their respective constitutional procedure and will come into force with effect from
the date on which the instruments of 

ratification are exchanged,

SHEIKH-INDIRA ACCORD 1975, AGREED CONCLUSIONS
1. The State of Jammu and Kashmir which is a constituent unit of the Union of
India, shall, in its relation with the Union, continue to be governed by Article
370 of the Constitution of India.

2. The residuary powers of legislation shall remain with the State; however,
Parliament will continue to have power to 

make laws relating to the prevention
of activities directed towards disclaiming, questioning or disrupting the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of India or bringing about cession of a
part of the territory of India or secession of a part of the territory of India
from the Union or causing insult to the Indian National Flag, the Indian
National Anthem and the Constitution.

3. Where any provision of the Constitution of India had been applied to the
State of Jammu and Kashmir with adaptation and modification, such
adaptations and modifications can be altered 

or repealed by an order of the
President under Article 370, each individual proposal in this behalf being
considered on its merits; but provisions of the Constitution of India already
applied to the State of Jammu and Kashmir without adaptation or modification
are unalterable.

4. With a view to assuring freedom to the State of Jammu and Kashmir to have
its own legislation on matters like welfare measures, cultural matters, social
security, personal law and procedural laws, in a manner suited to the special
conditions in the State, it is agreed that the State Government can review the
laws made by Parliament or extended to the State after 1953 on any matter
relatable to the Concurrent List and may decide which of them, in its opinion,
needs amendment or repeal.

5. A suitable modification of that Article as applied to State should be made by
Presidential order to the effect that no law made by the Legislature of the
State of Jammu and Kashmir, seeking to make any change in or in the effect
of any provision of Constitution of the State of Jammu and Kashmir relating
to any of the under mentioned matters, shall take effect unless the Bill, having
been reserved for the consideration of the President, receives his assent; the
matters are: (a) the appointment, powers, functions, duties, privileges and

immunities of the Governor, and (b) the following matters relating to Elections
amely, the superintendence, direction and control of Elections by the
Election Commission of India, eligibility for inclusion in the electoral rolls
without discrimination, adult suffrage and composition of the Legislative
Council, being matters specified in sections 138, 139, 140 and 50 of the
Constitution of the State of Jammu and Kashmir.

6. No agreement was possible on the question of nomenclature of the Governor

and the Chief Minister and the matter is therefore remitted to the Principals.